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ARGUMENT
I.

The Decision to Revoke Ms. Powell's Nursing License Was Based on an
Unsupported Assumption That She Has a Substance Abuse Problem
and Thus, Must be Reversed.

The Division's decision to revoke Ms. Powell's nursing license is not supported
by substantial evidence. This is a unique situation in which there is not a specific finding
of fact that is unsupported, but rather it is the inferences and conclusions drawn by the
Division from the facts that is unsupported. As thoroughly explained in Ms. Powell's
Appellant Brief, the Division has used the absence of drug testing results to improperly
conclude that Ms. Powell has a substance abuse problem and therefore, is a threat to
public safety. The Division has absolutely no affirmative evidence that Ms. Powell is a
drug abuser. In fact, the evidence before the Division suggests Ms. Powell does not use
drugs. There are no positive drug test results in evidence. Both Ms. Call (Compliance
Specialist for the Board of Nursing) and Ms. Poe (Division Bureau Manager) admitted
that the Division has no evidence of unauthorized drug use by Ms. Powell, and that no
accusations have been made against Ms. Powell for improper use of controlled
substances. (See Hearing Transcript at pp. 23, 43, 44 & 54, starting at R. 161.) Ms.
Powell's Self-Assessment Reports are void of any evidence suggesting drug relapse
and/or consumption of medications not lawfully prescribed to her. (See R. 175, 178, 181,
184, 187, 189, 192, 195 and 198.) Ms. Powell's Employer Reports are void of any
information suggesting that substance-abuse related behaviors interfered with her
employment and in fact, describe her as an excellent nurse. (See R. 176, 179, 182, 185,
188, 190, 193 and 199.) In the Employer Report dated September 8, 2009, Ms. Powell's
l
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supervisor reported that random urine samples had been obtained from Ms. Powell and
that there was no evidence of drug consumption. {See R. 199.) While under the 2007
and 2008 Stipulations, Ms. Powell obtained and maintained employment as a nurse. Ms.
Powell would not have been hired, nor would have she been able to perform to the level
described in the monthly reports, had she been using drugs.

The above-described

evidence has been entirely disregarded. The Division jumped to the conclusion that if
Ms. Powell had participated in the drug testing program, her results would have been
positive for drug use.

This assumption is unjustified, unfair and not supported by

substantial evidence; in fact, it is not supported by any evidence.
In attempts to further its argument, the Division has referenced disciplinary action
taken against Ms. Powell by the Arizona Board of Nursing in 2005 and 2006. Such
disciplinary action has no relevance to the matters at issue on appeal. The hearing which
ultimately resulted in the revocation of Ms. Powell's nursing license involved allegations
of failure to comply with the 2008 Utah Stipulation. Any reference or consideration of
the Arizona matter would be improper as that was not an issue in determination before
the Board. Moreover, Ms. Powell disputes the accuracy and appropriateness of the
actions taken by the Arizona Board of Nursing.

Accordingly, such information should

be disregarded entirely.
The Division has attempted to argue that the decision to revoke Ms. Powell's
license was not based on an assumption of a drug abuse problem, but rather based on the
violation of multiple provisions of the 2008 Stipulation. Specifically, the Division claims
Ms. Powell violated the five following stipulation provisions:
2
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(1) failing to meet with the Division on May 28, 2008; (2)
failing to provide a copy of a prescription for hydrocodone to
the Division; (3) failing to provide reports and documentation
to the Division on the first day of the month for the months of
May, June and July 2009; (4) failing to notify the Board in
writing within one week of any change in employer,
employment or practice status; and (5) failing to sign up with
Compass Vision for drug testing.
(See Appellant's Brief at p. 8.) Despite claims to the contrary, Ms. Powell has and will
again play the role of devil's advocate and marshal all evidence relating to the Division's
allegations against her. Testimony given during the January 14, 2010 hearing disproves
the Division's argument.

Ms. Powell thoroughly explained and/or disproved any

wrongdoing concerning four of the five alleged violations. The only alleged violation
that Ms. Powell was unable to explain to the Division's satisfaction was the failure to
enroll in a drug screening program.
First, the Division alleged that Ms. Powell failed to attend a meeting with the
Division on May 28, 2008. Ms. Call first testified that Ms. Powell did not give any
advanced notice for her absence. (See Hearing Transcript at p. 10, starting at R. 161.)
However, Ms. Call subsequently explained that she did have a conversation with Ms.
Powell on May 27, 2008 and that Ms. Powell explained that she would not be able to
attend the scheduled meeting because she was in Arizona helping her daughter who had
gone into premature labor and delivered a sick infant. (See Hearing Transcript at p. 18,
19, 66 & 67, starting at R. 161.) The Division claims it was Ms. Powell's responsibility
to let them know when she returned to Utah so their meeting could be rescheduled. (See
Hearing Transcript at p. 18 & 19, starting at R. 161.) It was Ms. Powell's understanding
3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that the Division would advise her when the Board planned to meet again and that her
appointment to appear before the Board would be rescheduled. {See Hearing Transcript
at p. 66 & 67, starting at R. 161.) Between April 2009 and October 2009, the Division
never contacted Ms. Powell or Ms. Powell's attorney to reschedule the meeting. {See
Hearing Transcript at p. 19 & 20, starting at R. 161.) When Ms. Powell was instructed to
meet with the Board in January 2009, she complied. {See Hearing Transcript at p. 66 &
67, starting at R. 161.)
Second, the Division alleged Ms. Powell failed to provide a copy of a
hydrocodone prescription. {See Hearing Transcript at p. 10 & 11, starting at R. 161.)
Ms. Powell explained that she was extremely ill in April 2009 when she was given a
prescription for a cough medicine that contained hydrocodone. {See Hearing Transcript
at p. 68, starting at R. 161.) Ms. Powell believes she sent in a copy of the prescription as
required and does not know why it was not received by the Division. (See Hearing
Transcript at p. 68, starting at R. 161.) There have not been any other controlled
substance prescriptions for which Ms. Powell did not notify the Division. (See Hearing
Transcript at p. 68, starting at R. 161.)
Third, the Division alleged that Ms. Powell failed to submit monthly reports in
May, June and July 2009 as required by the 2008 Stipulation. (See Hearing Transcript at
p. 12, starting at R. 161.) This allegation was based on Ms. Call's position that the
reports were due on the first day of each month. (See Hearing Transcript at p. 12 & 13,
starting at R. 161.) However, Ms. Call later admitted that the language of the 2008
Stipulation did not state the reports had to be submitted by the first of the month. (See
4
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Hearing Transcript at p. 25 & 26, starting at R. 161.) Ms. Call admitted that the Division
did in fact receive Ms. Powell's monthly assessment reports for May, June and July 2009.
(See Hearing Transcript at p. 24, starting at R. 161.) Moreover, Judge Eklund stated:
The Board initially finds and concludes there is a lack of
sufficient evidence [Ms. Powell] failed to timely submit
monthly reports to the Division between May 2009 through
July 2009. Specifically, [Ms. Powell] provided the required
reports to the Division during those months . . . . Since the
Board finds and concludes the reports were submitted at
some point during each month, no proper basis exists to find
[Ms. Powell] violated the governing Order in that regard.
(R. 153) (emphasis added.)
Fourth, the Division alleged that Ms. Powell did not appropriately submit
employer reports (i.e. within one week of any change in employment practice). (See
Hearing Transcript at p. 16 & 17, starting at R. 161.) Specifically, it is the Division's
position that Ms. Powell ended employment with one employer on August 10, 2009, but
did not notify the Board until September 1, 2009, and that several weeks passed before
Ms. Powell advised them of new employment with Life Care in October 2009. (See
Hearing Transcript at p. 17, starting at R. 161.) Nonetheless, Ms. Call admitted that
during the times Ms. Powell was working, Ms. Powell submitted employer reports. (See
Hearing Transcript at p. 26, starting at R. 161.) When Ms. Powell was not working, she
accurately documented her status on a self-assessment report. (See Hearing Transcript at
p. 26, starting at R. 161.) On September 1, 2009, the Division received an employer
report from Ms, Powell indicating she was not working and on October 5, 2009, the
Division received a report explaining that Ms. Powell has started a new job. (See
5
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Hearing Transcript at p. 26 & 27, starting at R 161 ) T11 Is

^ 'oi^i.v ;;

sion

had been notified and was aware of all the employment Ms. Powell ncld oetween
December ,. _. * and September 30, 2009. (See Hearing Transcript at p. 29, starting at
R I () I.)
Lastly, the Division alleged that Ms. Powell failed to enroll and participate in the
Compass Vision drug screening program. (See Hearing Transcript at r

v \2, starting

at R 161 .) ; \ lai ge poi tion of the J am lary hearing w as spent discus: .. o .. . ' masons Ms.
Powell did not register for Compass Vision. Ms. Powell testified aouui

Dncerns

relating to the integrity of Compass Vision's chain-of-custody procedures. It was Ms.
Po \ v ell's fear that the chain -of-custod> problems at Compass Vision would cause her to
receive a false positive result. Such iss-:<. —

^

^ !"-< *T.d-.' V. *• ^ -

\r

not enrolling. (See Hearing Transcript at p. 42 & 43, starting at R. l o l , and iv. 148-151.)
Ms. Powell raised these concerns Willi Ms. I'oc. Ms. Poe admitted that she was aware,
pii*""' <o» Ms, ('Vvui! cnfcniit?, iln' 1 Kremlin" ?0t^

<li| iil.iliori,,

n

t' elumHil-i.'uslMdv

problems with Compass Vision testing procedures. (See Hearing Transcript at p. 51 &
52, starting at R 161; and R, 151.) While M s . Powell w a s willing t o participate in a drug
testing progran i < )1 1 iei I I i: n L Compass \ ision, !\ Is, I "' :)e
Transcript al p. lb & 47, starting at R. 161.)

:n ild not alio \ v that. (See I learing

Hie Division had a contract with Compass

Vision. Thus, even though there were chain-of-custody concerns with Compass Vision,
testing with a diffeni

-

•

c .no

rai^cnpi „

starting aiR. iVA.)
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The Division's decision to revoke Ms, Powell's nursing license was premised on
Ms. Powell's failure to enroll in drug testing, and assumptions made by the Division
because of that failure. Ms. Poe testified that she "could wink an eye at most everything
but the drug screening" and that the absence of drug testing was "the issue that's
absolutely most severe." {See Hearing Transcript at p. 50 & 51, starting at R. 161)
(emphasis added.) In the May 2010 Order, Judge Eklund stated that if Ms. Powell's
alleged violations had not included a failure to participate in a drug screening program,
"it may be warranted to only extend [her] probationary status under that Order or possibly
suspend her nursing license for a brief time." (R. 138.) The evidence clearly shows that
the Division's decision to revoke Ms. Powell's license was not based on multiple
violations of the 2008 Stipulation. The only alleged violation that Ms. Powell could not
explain to the Division's satisfaction was the allegation concerning drug testing. But for
that issue, the Division would not have entered the punitive punishment of revocation.
During the January 2010 hearing, various members of the Nursing Board
repeatedly stated that the Board's purpose and focus is to maintain public safety. {See
Hearing Transcript at p. 93 & 103, starting at R. 161.) However, simply failing to
register for the Compass Vision program does not establish that Ms. Powell is a risk to
public safety. The Division cannot conclude that Ms. Powell is a danger to public safety
unless they assume she has a substance abuse problem. In February 2011, the Division's
Executive Director Francine Giani stated that the failure to provide a sample for drug
analysis was equivalent to a positive test result. (R. 10.) This assumption was reiterated
by the Division in its Appellee's Brief. {See Appellee's Brief at p. 5 & 13.) The Division
7
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improperly a s s u m e d thai nil <i>i M s h m v l l ' - i drnn teuls Viiuikl h a \ e been positive, a n d
used that assumption to permanently revoke her nursing license.
There is no evidence in this ease to support the Division's conclusion that Ms.
I}o well has a si lbstance abuse problem and """oi Is a threat to public safety
evidence that directly contradicts that conclusion.

In fact, there is

I he Order revoking Ms I "' i\ v e 11' s

license is permanent. It forever deprives Ms. Powell of the ability to perform gainful
emplu^hieiil a a nurse,

i lie revocation h a s also deprivec *-l- i'wucii o- \:-... a>-\- •' t o

secure e m p l o y m e n t outsui.

*

•*

*^ *

•-.

* e.j- -

••••;

revocation was implemented, Ms. Powell has been declined job placement because of the
disciplinary status of her nursing license. Hence, Ms. Powell bn> been, and will forever
contini le to be, substantially preji idiced ,

*

* • ..

• .:e--ivn-

The Division has cited to Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm.

855 P.2d 267

(Utah 1993), in attempts to argue that Ms. Powell has not properly preserved issues for
appeal

I he 4. s he rq ft decisic n is distingi lishable on this Issue and thus. ;ai.:>. * rurther the

Division's argument. In Ashcroft, Dennis Ashcroft claimed
rendered him unable to work and thus, he petitioned for additional temporary disability
benefits

A 1 a for iiial hearing, 1 he i \ I ,1 ref used to convene a medical panel and denied

Mr. Ashcroft's request f o r benefits.

Ashcroft m o v e d (he Industrial C o m m i s s i o n tnr

review rn the ^ I, Mi:' 'he \T J had icH^ed
C-*J i !is»u>n a

..

. convene a medical panel.

I he

. benefits ai<*. A.-i.av i\. sought a judicial review.

Ashcroft's arguments on judicial re view did not concei ti the • faih ire to com ene a me die #1
panel, but rather were sufficiency of evidence, standard of proof and adequacy of
8
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findings. The Court concluded that Ashcroft had "waived the issues of sufficiency of
evidence and adequacy of the ALJ's findings" because he "failed to raise the . . . issues
before the Commission." Id at 268-69. Unlike in Ashcroft, Ms. Powell's arguments on
judicial review are the exact same arguments she raised before the administrative agency.
A lack of supporting evidence has been Ms. Powell's argument through the entire appeals
process. (R. 17-23, 55-66 and 117-123.) As such, Ms. Powell has in fact properly
preserved her arguments for judicial review.
Ms. Powell has also challenged the sufficiency of the ALJ's findings.

As

discussed above, Ms. Powell is challenging the inferences and assumptions drawn from
the facts in this case including the inferences and assumptions made by the ALJ. The
recommendation given by the ALJ to revoke Ms. Powell's nursing license was based on
an improper assumption that Ms. Powell has a substance abuse problem.
In filing this appeal, Ms. Powell is not seeking immediate reinstatement of her
nursing license. Ms. Powell is simply asking that the parties take a step back and
objectively look at the situation. Rather than permanent revocation, it would be much
more reasonable for Ms. Powell's license to be placed in a probationary status until she
has proven her drug-free status with a reliable drug testing program.

Permanent

revocation is an excessive punishment for which there is no supporting evidence. For
these reasons, the Division's decision to revoke Ms. Powell's nursing license must be
reversed.

9
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II.

1 'he Decision to Revoke Ms. Powell's N ursing
Capricious and Thus, M u s t be Reversed.

For the reasons stated above, an assumption of drug abuse did in fact serve as the
basis for revocation ol Ms Powell's nursing license. That improper and unwarranted

unreasonable nature r f :he Division's decision is evidenced b> the following: (1) the
decision is Inconsistent uitb r>-]c~ disciplinary practices; i *• "^ (be decision Is being
imposed based

••

i

i

• • * nough or has not

exhibited sufficient remorse.
First, the arbitrary and capricious nature of the Division's revocation is evidenced
punishments handed down fn ^ther healthcare providers in

b;y its inconsistency
similar circumstances.

*;

•*

i

- >\

f

*

,

appeal

In the briefs

submitted at the agency level, M s . Povvell repeatedly and consistently argued that the
agency's decision to revoke heir license was arbitrary and capricious. (R. 61-64 and 1191 211 .) Inconsistencj of disciplinary • actions is bi it c n s : f the issues tl K it m >es t<: the
arbitrary and capricious nature of the Division's decision.

Whether iv^. *

;

punishment was consistent with disciplinary actions taken against other licensees was
raise d for the first time I »] > thi ? Di i isu : >,. i at the J am lai ;; 2010 hearing. During liic ;,iiui
reply to closing argument, counsel for the Division stated that no second ch:r\

\

given to Ms. Powell because her situation was different from other discipline cases.
I really think that in this case there is just no opportunity for
a second chance. I've seen cases where we've done it but
it's because they've really come in and made a contrite
admission and they're willing to own it and take personal
in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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responsibility for their failures. I don't see that here with
Ms. Powell.
(Hearing Transcript at p. 120 & 121, starting at R. 161)(emphasis added.) The Division
did not raise this issue in any of its briefings and did not bring it up prior to closing
arguments.
Second, the revocation of Ms. Powell's nursing license is arbitrary and capricious
because it was imposed as means of punishing Ms. Powell for not expressing the amount
of remorse expected by the Division. (See Hearing Transcript at p. 103, 104 & 121,
starting at R. 161.) In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Powell clearly and accurately cited
hearing testimony in which she explained that she never meant not to violate the
stipulation terms and that her noncompliance was not purposeful. (See Appellant Brief at
p. 14 & 15 and Hearing Transcript at p. 76, 102 & 103, starting at R. 161.) Ms. Powell's
failure to enroll in drug testing is not an issue of credibility. Ms. Powell was concerned
about the reliability of testing procedure and the problems a false positive result would
create. Ms. Powell did not believe that the Division and/or Ms. Poe were taking her
concerns seriously. It was Ms. Powell's perception that the Division was sending her to
Compass Vision to fail.
The Division has unreasonably chosen permanent license revocation as the means
of teaching Ms. Powell a lesson. "And I wished you would have learned your lesson
sooner. We wouldn't be here today." (Hearing Transcript at p. 102, starting at R. 161)
(emphasis added.) Arbitrarily imposing permanent license revocation versus probation or
some other less severe punishment as a means of teaching Ms. Powell a lesson is entirely
11
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unreasonable. The "lesson" the Board believes it needs to impose is no longer necessary.
Ms. Powell has recognized her noncompliance with the stipulation. (Hearing Transcript
at pp. 76 & 103, starting at R. 161.) She has also expressed remorse for her decisions and
admitted to learning from her actions. (Hearing Transcript at p. 103, starting at R. 161.)
Ms. Powell's situation can more appropriately be handled with measures short of license
revocation. Ms. Powell has never been shown to be a threat to public safety. In fact, her
employer reports have been good. Besides herself, Ms. Powell has never hurt anyone.
The Division's decision to permanently revoke Ms. Powell's nursing license as a means
of making sure she is sorry for what she has done, and/or "teaching her a lesson" is
arbitrary, capricious and completely unreasonable.

The Division's decision must be

reversed.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Powell respectfully requests that the Division's decision revoking her nursing
license be reversed.
DATED this /Aa y

of September, 2011.
STRONG & HANNI

By:

(JxTY"^^^-

H^. L^s^ <w

Catherine M. Larson
Jennifer R. Carrizal
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
Stacie Powell
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